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Abstract 
Aristotle’s explanation of what is said ‘of every’ and ‘of none’ has been interpreted either as 
involving individuals (of which something is said ‘of every’, or of which something is said ‘of 
none’), or as regarding exclusively universal terms. I claim that Alexander of Aphrodisias 
endorsed this latter interpretation of the dictum de omni et de nullo. This interpretation affects 
our understanding of Alexander’s syllogistic: as a matter of fact, Alexander maintained that 
the dictum de omni et de nullo is one of the core principles of syllogistic.  
 
Keywords: Aristotle – Alexander of Aphrodisias – Prior Analytics – Aristotle’s commentators 
– syllogistic – dictum de omni et de nullo 
 
Aristotle opens his treatise on  syllogistic inference with some definitions. Among other 
things, he presents a definition of propositions. A proposition is said to be an affirmative or a 
negative assertion of something with respect to something: 
πρότασις µὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατά τινος.1  
                                                        
1 A. Pr. A, 1, 24 a16-17. 
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A proposition may be one of the premises or a conclusion of a syllogism. 
Propositions, as Aristotle also explains in De Int. 7, may have different quantity and quality: 
universal and particular, affirmative and negative. Aristotle’s standard example of a universal 
affirmative proposition, which can figure as a premise of a syllogism, is the following: 
B is said of all A. 
The expression ‘of all’ is expounded in these terms by the philosopher:  
λέγοµεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι ὅταν µηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν [τοῦ 
ὑποκειµένου] καθ᾿οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται’.2  
Traditionally this elucidation has been labelled as dictum de omni. As is well known, there is a 
certain debate among contemporary scholars about the more suitable interpretation of 
Aristotle’s conception of the dictum. There are two possible ways of interpreting the dictum 
de omni, which I shall label as ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ versions of the dictum, following 
the example of Jonathan Barnes:3 
(Orthodox dictum de omni): B is said of all A, iff there is no individual of which (the term) A 
is truly said, of which (the term) B is not truly said. 
(Heterodox dictum de omni): B is said of all A, iff there is no term of which A is truly said, of 
which B is not truly said. 
Barnes argues that Aristotle endorsed the orthodox version of the dictum, because (i) 
‘Aristotle’s Greek can hardly be construed in the way demanded by the heterodox dictum’ and 
(ii) ‘the dictum is meant to offer a definition of ‘of every’ and ‘of no’ ’,4 but it is hard to think 
that the definiens of ‘of every’ will also include an instance of the predication ‘of every’—and 
this would be the case, if the dictum were heterodox.5 Thus, Barnes argues, according to 
Aristotle the dictum de omni must be understood in the orthodox way. Other scholars have 
instead defended the heterodox version. Among them was the late Michael Frede who 
attended the John Locke lectures, in which Barnes was explaining his reconstruction of 
ancient logic, and during the discussion inspired Barnes to discuss this version of the dictum.6 
The heterodox version presents many advantages. It allows us, for example, to construct a 
semantic interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic which rejects all the syllogistic 
connections rejected by the philosopher and to validate all modal syllogisms he considers 
                                                        
2 A. Pr. A, 1, 24 b28-30. 
3
 Cf. Barnes 2007, pp. 386-421. 
4
 Barnes 2007, p. 412. 
5
 According to the heterodox interpretation, A is said of all B, iff for every C, if B is said of C, 
then A is said of all C. In this interpretation the relation ‘is said of all’ is the same both in the 
definiendum, and in the definiens – and this is the case because both A, and B, and C are kind 
terms. In the orthodox interpretation, instead, A is said of all B, iff for every x, if B is said of x, 
then A is said of x: the predicative relation between A and B in the definiendum is different from 
that between B and x, or that between A and x in the definiens, and this is also due to the fact that 
x is not a kind term, like A or B. 
6
 Cf. Morison 2008, pp. 212-213. 
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valid.7 The orthodox version seems to conflict with the ‘mereological’ ideas on which 
Malink’s appreciated interpretation is based. Hence Malink finds the heterodox version of the 
dictum more convincing.8  It remains thus an object of dispute whether Aristotle endorsed the 
former or the latter version of the dictum. Many good reasons can be advanced in favour of 
each of the two conflicting interpretations and it is difficult to understand what Aristotle really 
had in mind. 9  I, therefore, leave Aristotle aside, since my intention is to present Alexander of 
Aphrosias’ opinions about this topic. The principal aim of this paper is to show that Alexander 
of Aphrodisias held consistently the heterodox interpretation of the dictum de omni. This 
claim is not trivial—if it is controversial to establish Aristotle’s authentic position, why 
should Alexander’s account be less ambiguous, given that the commentator of Aphrodisias 
closely followed the doctrines expanded by the Stagirite? Even if Alexander took one of the 
two sides of the controversy, does textual evidence univocally support the heterodox version? 
And even though he supported that version, was Alexander aware that his interpretation could 
be faced by a conflicting and competitive proposal? What led the commentator to maintain 
that Aristotle was embracing the heterodox version of the dictum? In other words, are there 
philosophical and historical reasons that might lie behind Alexander’s interpretation?  
As I have suggested, the canvas is far from being clear. What follows aims to give an answer 
to each of these questions. 
                                                        
7
 This reconstruction of Aristotle’s modal logic is developed in Malink 2006. Malink himself 
stresses that this interpretation of the dictum is preferable, because it is open to the possibility of a 
‘mereological’ account of the relations among terms (cf. Malink 2008, p. 523), and this account is 
able to demonstrate the validity of all and only the syllogistic moods accepted by Aristotle. 
8 Cf. Malink 2008. 
9
 Paolo Crivelli has cautiously argued in favor of the orthodox interpretation of the dictum (cf. 
Crivelli 2011, Crivelli 2012). I am inclined to agree with him, mainly because I do not see any 
plausible solution to the second objection which J. Barnes raises against the heterodox version. 
Both B. Morison and M. Malink, in their attempts to solve this objection, suggest that Aristotle is 
merely presenting some properties of the dictum de omni et de nullo, but not properly proposing a 
definition (cf. Morison 2008, p. 214; Malink 2009, pp. 116-117). This answer to Barnes’s remark 
would have been plausible, if Aristotle had not said, at the very beginning of A. Pr. A, 1, that he 
first wants to define what propositions, syllogisms, terms, perfection and the dictum de omni are 
(cf. A. Pr. A, 1, 24 a11-15). After that presentation, the Stagirite clearly gives a definition of 
proposition (cf. A. Pr. A, 1, 24 a16-17) and of syllogism (cf. A. Pr. A, 1, 24 b18-20). Hence, it is 
reasonable to suppose, with Barnes, that Aristotle’s elucidations on the dictum de omni et de nullo 
(cf. A. Pr. A, 1, 24 b28-30) are true definitions too. However things might seem with respect to 
Aristotle’s own opinions, it is worth noting that Alexander’s strategy too appears to be very 
similar to that of modern supporters of the ‘heterodox version’ of the dictum de omni. Whilst in 
the case of proposition (cf. in A. Pr. 10.15), syllogism (cf. in A. Pr. 16.24-31) and perfection (cf. 
in A. Pr. 23.17-18) Alexander clearly says that Aristotle is expounding their definitions, the 
commentator remarks that as far as the dictum is concerned, the Stagirite ‘first makes clear those 
things and teaches us what is to be in a whole and what is the dictum de omni’ (πρῶτον ταῦτα 
γνώριµα ποιεῖ, καὶ διδάσκει ἡµᾶς, τί µέν ἐστι τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντός in A. Pr. 24.23-
24). Alexander does not explicitly speak of definitions: according to him, Aristotle is only 
presenting a clarification of what he thinks that the relation ‘to be in a whole’ and the dictum de 
omni are. And this is consistent with my interpretation of Alexander’s opinions concerning the 
dictum de omni et de nullo. 
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1. Evidence in Favour of the Orthodox Reading 
 
There is apparently some textual evidence against my claim. Let me briefly present it in this 
section. In section 2, I shall explain why this evidence does not necessarily impose an 
interpretation conflicting with my own.  
When Alexander comments on Aristotle’s exposition of the dictum de omni, it seems that he 
endorses the orthodox interpretation, since he says: 
since every affirmative proposition is composed by a subject term and by a 
predicate, it is true to say that the predicate is said of all (κατὰ παντός) of the 
subject, when it is impossible to take anything of the subject of which the 
predicate is not said. For example: ‘animal is said of all men’; in fact, it is 
impossible to take any man of whom animal is not said. 10 
From this passage it is clear that the subject and the predicate of the propositions are terms, 
but in the dictum the logical subject seems to be truly predicated of individuals, not of a term 
which designates a subclass of the subject itself: ‘animal is said of all men iff there is no 
(individual) man of whom animal does not hold.’ 
A similar conclusion seems to be implied by Alexander’s comments on the dictum de 
nullo: 
the dictum de nullo will be presented the other way around: when it is 
impossible to take anything of the subject of which the predicate is said, then 
the dictum de nullo is truly said. For instance ‘neighing is said of no man’, 
because there is no man of whom neighing is predicated. 11 
In this case too it seems that ‘no man’ (οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος) means that John is not a neighing 
thing, nor is Peter, nor Mary etc. This is, indeed, not a simplistic interpretation of Alexander, 
but what a reader would suppose at first glance from these passages. 
It is arguable also from a theoretical viewpoint that the orthodox version of the dicta would be 
a more suitable explanation of Alexander’s view. The commentator thought that the terms 
which can be either subject or predicate of a proposition stand necessarily for one of the 
Aristotelian categories. 12  Let us assume that in a universal affirmative proposition (‘B is said 
                                                        
10
 In A. Pr. 24.30-25.2: ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶσα πρότασις κατηγορικὴ ἐξ ὑποκειµένου ὅρου ἐστὶ καὶ 
κατηγορουµένου, τότε λέγεται ὁ κατηγορούµενος κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ ὑποκειµένου ἀληθῶς, ὅταν 
µηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειµένου, καθ᾿οὗ οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ κατηγορούµενον, οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατὰ 
παντὸς ἀνθρώπου· οὐδένα γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον, καθ᾿οὗ τὸ ζῷον οὐ ῥηθήσεται. 
11
 In A. Pr. 25.17-21: ἔσται γὰρ ἀνάπαλιν ἀποδιδόµενον τὸ κατὰ µηδενός· ὅταν γὰρ µηδὲν ᾖ 
λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειµένου, καθ᾿οὗ τὸ κατηγορούµενον ῥηθήσεται, τότε ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κατὰ µηδενὸς 
ἀληθῶς, οἷον τὸ χρεµετιστικὸν κατ᾿οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπου· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, καθ᾿οὗ τὸ 
χρεµετιστικὸν κατηγορεῖται. 
12
 Cf. in A. Pr. 366.22-33. 
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of all A’) both terms refer to substances. This is clearly the case if one says: ‘animal is said of 
all men’. If someone endorses the heterodox version of the dictum de omni, it is necessary to 
find a third term C, such that if A is said of all C, then also B is said of all C. A substance-
term S1 can be predicated of another substance-term S2 iff S1 is a genus (or a differentia) of S2. 
There is strong evidence in favour of this claim in Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s 
Topics, because the commentator is explicit with respect to this point, and his pieces of 
doctrine may be easily systematized. 
According to him, a term X can be said simpliciter of a term Y (namely X is said of all Y) iff 
X is either a genus or a differentia, or a proprium, or a definition of Y. 13   
Accidents are not said simpliciter and hence it is impossible that a substance is accidentally 
predicated of another substance.14 But also propria cannot be predicated in the genus of a 
substance, because they are similar to accidents (cf. in Top. 66.20-22) insofar as they do not 
show anything of a thing’s essence (cf. Top. A, 5, 102 a18-19). In other words, a substance 
cannot be a proprium of another substance. Therefore only genera, differentiae and definitions 
may designate a substance (cf. in Top. 65.6-66.22).  
 
By reading the Prior Analytics against the background of the theory of predication expounded 
in the Topics, Alexander may indeed claim that the dictum de omni should be understood 
according to the heterodox interpretation. This is a trivial conclusion, because the terms of a 
syllogism cannot refer to individuals if they should be one of the predicables, as Alexander 
maintains.15 This notwithstanding, it is still worth exploring what follows from Alexander’s 
claim. 
If one wants to know which praedicabile can be the term B in the proposition (i) ‘B is said of 
all A’ (where both B and A signify the category of substance), it is possible to rule out not 
only accidents and propria, but also definitions, because they are formulas rather than terms 
(cf. Top. A, 5, 102 a4-5), and, for the sake of argument, I decided to take in consideration only 
the terms.  
Among the remaining praedicabilia, it is worth noting that differentiae are considered 
together with genera (cf. Top. A, 4, 101 b18-19) and that Alexander considers them to be 
equivalent to substances:  
‘hence the differentiae are in substance, since they are substances too, and the 
problems concerning the differentiae will also belong to [the consideration of] 
substance’.16  
I hold that Alexander has in mind in this passage the doctrine expanded by Aristotle in Met. Z, 
12, where the Stagirite maintains that the unity of the definition is granted by the last 
                                                        
13
 Cf. in A. Pr. 366.33-367.11. 
14 Cf. in Top. 66.15: ‘οὐδεμία οὐσία οὐδεμιᾷ οὐσίᾳ συμβέβηκεν’. 
15 Cf. in Pr. An. 366.33-367.3. 
16
 In Top. 65.32-66.1: διὸ καὶ ἐν οὐσίᾳ διαφοραὶ οὖσαι [οὐσίαι] καὶ αὐταί, καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν 
διαφορῶν προβλήµατα καὶ ἐν οὐσίᾳ ἔσται. 
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differentia, which is the substance and the definition of the thing. In other words, the number 
of the element of the definition makes no difference, because they can be reduced to the 
highest genus and to the last differentia: the lower genera are obtained from the first genus 
(G1) plus the differentiae (d1, d2…), which make the subgenera of G1: a certain genus Gk is 
thus analysable as G1+dk-1. The infima species, i.e. the indivisible species, will be therefore the 
last genus, lower than G1, with the addition of the last differentia. Otherwise stated, with the 
exception of the last differentia—which is identical with the indivisible species—a substance 
can be named with a genus. 
Let us come back to our universal affirmative proposition (i): either (a) B is equal to A and A 
is an indivisible species—and therefore it is necessary to assume that B is the last 
differentia—or (b) B is predicated of all A and also of other terms different from A, and A is 
an indivisible species, or (c) A is a divisible species and B is its genus, or (d) A and B are 
equal in extension, but they are not infimae species. 
If someone considers the first possibility, trying to clarify it with the help of the heterodox 
dictum, a problem suddenly emerges: which term C will be such that A is said of all C and B 
is said of all C? Our hypothesis, indeed, implies that both A and B are terms that signify an 
indivisible species. Hence, there are no subspecies of A and of B such that both A and B are 
said of all of these subspecies. It seems, therefore, that it is impossible to apply the heterodox 
dictum de omni to the proposition (i) if one assumes that B is equal to A, because the two 
terms have no (proper) parts. The same problem arises in case (b), because A has no (proper) 
parts and, therefore, it is impossible to say that there are no As of which B is not said, since 
actually A is not said of anything else. 17 
As a consequence, it appears that the heterodox version of the dictum de omni in this 
particular case may be vindicated only under the assumption that if B and A are substances 
and if B is said of all A, then A must not be an indivisible species. However, at this point it 
should be clear that this last proposal too presents some difficulties. Let us suppose that B is a 
genus Gk and that A is a (divisible) species (e. g. ‘animal’), such that A=Gj (j>k)+dm. The last 
differentia in this case is supposed to be dn (n=m+z). If B is said of all A, then there will be a C, 
such that A is said of all C and B is said of all C.  
If Alexander had not added any further claim, this solution could work. However, as we shall 
see in detail in the next sections, Alexander also maintains that, in virtue of the dictum de 
                                                        
17
 If we had not ruled out definitions, B could have been a definition of A. 
It would also be possible that B and A are not infimae species, even though they have the same 
extension and B is not said of something different from A; in this case B and A would be 
synonymous terms for the same substance. For the sake of argument I do not consider in this 
context the case of synonymous terms. I think indeed that Alexander’s argument does not rely 
upon linguistic features: it is purely logical. If for every term T there were a synonymous term of 
T, namely St, it would be easy to solve the puzzle raised by the heterodox dictum de omni when, 
in the proposition (i) ‘B is said of all A’, both B and A are infimae species: there is no Sa of which 
A is said, of which B is not said. The implausibility of this solution rests on the fact that it is 
rather odd to assume that every term has a synonymous term. Moreover Aristotle and Alexander 
are not dealing with the characteristics of a given natural language: they are instead introducing a 
logical analysis of proposition and of predication at a logical level, which is reflected by the 
structure of Greek language, but which is not reducible to it.  
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omni,18 a universal affirmative proposition such as (i) can always be translated into a 
prosleptic proposition: 
(i’) B is said of all that of which A is said of all.19 
Why is this assumption problematic? Let us go back to our example. If one assumes that C is 
the term of all of which A is said, it is necessary to suppose that C=Gj+dm+r, where r≤z. In this 
way we have obtained a new true universal affirmative proposition, namely  
(ii) ‘A is said of all C’.  
In virtue of the dictum de omni, this proposition too can be translated into a prosleptic 
proposition in the usual way, and hence there must be a D, such that if C is said of all D, then 
A too is said of all D. In this way we have obtained a new true proposition, namely  
(iii) ‘A is said of all D’.20  
However, since z is an integer finite number, this process will have an end when one reaches a 
proposition like (x) ‘A is said of all T’, where T is a term such that T=Gj+dn, namely T refers 
to an indivisible species. At this point we are faced with the same difficulties raised by the 
cases (a) and (b). Thus one could be tempted to reject the heterodox version of the dictum de 
omni. According to the orthodox version, a proposition like (i) means that there is no 
individual x, such that if A is truly said of x, then B is not said of x. As a consequence the 
translation of (i) into a prosleptic proposition will be the following: 
(iv) ‘B is said of all A’ iff ‘if A is said of all x, then B is said of all x’. 
It will be impossible to make a further analysis of a proposition like  
(v) ‘A is said of all (individuals) x’ 
because the term-individuals relation, expressed by (v), is completely different from the term-
term relation, expressed by (i), and which enables the translation into a prosleptic proposition. 
So far, it seems that Alexander’s version of the dictum de omni et de nullo must be the 
orthodox one, and I have presented some textual evidence and a plausible theoretical 
argument in favour of this interpretation. 21 
                                                        
18
 Cf. also in A. Pr. 54.12-18. Here Alexander’s appeal to the to the dictum de omni is the ground 
on which a prosleptic proposition is introduced. As is clear from in A. Pr. 54.20ff., the prosleptic 
proposition is construed with three terms. 
19 Cf. for instance in A. Pr. 375.22-23. 
20
 This argument may appear problematic. From the truth of (ii) ‘A is said of all C’, and of (ii  ‘C 
is said of all D’ it does not follow that ‘A is said of all D’,  
21
 A further issue concerns echtetic proofs. As one of the referees has pointed to my attention, the 
fact that Alexander presents echtetic proofs with individual terms goes against the main claim of 
this paper (see in A. Pr. 33.2-5, 99.31-100.14, 104.1-3, 112.33-113.1, 122.17-21). This 
notwithstanding, we should keep in mind that Alexander stresses that ecthetic proofs are non-
syllogistic procedures (cf. in A. Pr. 33.1; 112.33-113.3), and, more importantly, they are 
superfluous, since all imperfect syllogisms may be proved tob e valid either through conversion 
 8 
 
 
2. Evidence in Favour of the Heterodox Interpretation 
 
However, this conclusion has to be avoided. I suggest that the apparent oddities of the 
heterodox version, presented in section 1, depend on the mistaken assumption that the third 
term, introduced in the prosleptic translation of a given universal proposition, must be 
(necessarily) different from the other two terms, which figure in the starting proposition. 
Indeed, if someone holds that the terms of a proposition like (i) must have different 
references, then if A is an indivisible species, the translation of (i) ‘B is said of all A’ into a 
prosleptic proposition (‘B is said of all the Cs of all of which A is said’) cannot single out any 
term C, different (in its reference) from A, such that A is said of C. According to the basic 
principles of Aristotle’s Categories, an indivisible species is predicated of all the primary 
substances that fall under it, and those individual substances must, therefore, be the Cs of the 
prosleptic transcription of (i). As a consequence, the predicative relation between A and the 
Cs cannot be further analysed and translated into another prosleptic proposition, because the 
Cs are primary substances, and primary substances are said neither to be in something else nor 
of something else. The problem raised by this orthodox solution, still, is its lack of consistency 
with Alexander’s claim that every proposition that expresses a predication ‘κατὰ παντός’ is 
capable of being translated into a prosleptic proposition. The commentator maintains in 
general that 
(i) ‘A is said of all the items, of all of which B is said’ is the same as (ii) ‘A is 
said of all B’ .22 
It is worthwhile to dwell on this claim. Alexander makes it commenting on Prior Analytics A, 
41, where Aristotle says that it is not the same to say ‘to all that, to which B belongs, A 
belongs’ and ‘to all that, to all of which B belongs, A belongs’. Aristotle adds, however, that 
if A belongs to everything of which B is truly said, A will be true of all of that of all of which 
B is said too.23 This is different from Alexander’s position; according to Alexander, all 
universal premises have a prosleptic counterpart. Alexander, presumably, relies on 
                                                        
rules, or by reductio ad impossibile (cf. in A. Pr. 24.2-18: here Alexander maintains that in order 
to prove the validity of all syllogisms we need the rules of conversions and the reductio ad 
impossibile; he often refers to ecthetic proofs as a “third method” to prove the validity of 
syllogisms, but the fact that he does not mention this method in this programmatic passage seems 
to suggest that Alexander took ecthetic proofs to be superfluous). The fact that Alexander was 
using individual terms in his ecthetic proofs can thus be interpreted as Alexander’s attempt to 
show that, also in non-standard (i.e., non-syllogistic) contexts, the valid syllogisms are valid; in 
other terms, Alexander’s observations on ecthetic proofs are peripheral, and do not alter the core 
ideas that he is developing in his syllogistic. It is true, however, that Alexander’s treatment of 
ecthetic proofs is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it is in conflict with the main line of thought of his 
treatment of syllogistic.  
22
 In A. Pr. 375.22-23: ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ‘καθ᾿οὗ παντὸς τὸ Β, κατ᾿ἐκείνου τὸ Α παντός’ τῷ 
κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Β τὸ Α. 
23
 Cf. A. Pr., A, 41, 49 b22-25: εἰ δὲ καθ᾿οὗ ἂν τὸ Β λέγηεται ἀληθῶς, τούτῳ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, 
συµβήσεται τὸ Α, καθ᾿οὗ παντὸς τὸ Β λέγεται, κατὰ τοῦτο παντὸς λέγεσθαι. 
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Theophrastus’s account: the philosopher of Eresus appears to be the first to have made this 
claim and is referred to by Alexander in in A. Pr. 378.14-20 and in in A. Pr. 379.9.24 It could 
be argued that Alexander tries to show a certain independency from Theophrastus 
(Alexander’s criticism of Theophrastus’s rejection of some mixed necessity syllogisms that 
Aristotle takes as sound in A. Pr., A, 9, is well known). Nonetheless, it should be remembered 
that the philosopher of Eresus played a crucial role in the development of successive 
Aristotelianism, and it is not surprising that Alexander follows him in interpreting Aristotle in 
this way.25 
Now, to claim that all universal propositions have a prosleptic counterpart has interesting 
consequences. On this basis it is arguable that for every proposition in which a term is said 
‘κατὰ παντός’ of a second term, it is always possible to find a third term which allows the 
translation into a prosleptic proposition—thus, even if A is a term for an infima species, in the 
prosleptic translation we ought to find certain Cs of which A is said. From this thesis, one 
could infer that C must be identical with A; and this is certainly correct, because, in at least 
one sense of ‘identical’, 26 A (which is an infima species) and C must be identical—namely, 
they are identical in specie. But are the terms A and C at least in some cases the same term? 
Prima facie, it seems that the answer is no. The claim according to which every universal 
proposition can be translated into its prosleptic counterpart does not directly imply that the 
third term C of the prosleptic proposition must be the same term as the logical subject of the 
starting proposition. In order to translate the proposition (i) ‘B is said of all A’ into its 
prosleptic counterpart, it would always be possible to find a term C different from A—even if 
A is an indivisible species—if one supposes that there are infinite propria for every substance: 
if A is either a proprium of a substance S, or it is the substance S, then C could be the term 
which designates one of the infinite propria of S. Such a supposition, however, has to be 
rejected, because according to Aristotle, there is a finite number of beings in the universe, and 
hence the propria of a given substance cannot be infinite either.27  These supplementary 
considerations imply that C—the third term, needed in the prosleptic translation of a universal 
                                                        
24
 On this issue see Gili 2011, p. 160. 
25
 On Alexander’s general evaluation of Theophrastus’s understanding of Aristotle’s syllogistic 
cf. Gili 2011, pp. 30-49. 
26
 As is well known, Aristotle – followed in this by Alexander – distinguishes many senses of 
identity: we have, indeed, identity per analogiam, in genere, in specie and in numero (cf. Top. H, 
1; Met. ∆, 6, 1016 b31-35; 9, 1019 a12-13). Hence, in our example, A and C cannot be identical 
per analogiam or in genere, because otherwise it would be false to say that A is said of all C 
(there could be some Cs of which A is not said). 
27
 However, they would have to be infinite if they were the third term of any possible translation 
of a proposition like (i) ‘B is said of all A’ – where A is an indivisible substance – into a 
prosleptic proposition, if we suppose that every third term of the prosleptic proposition must be 
different (in its reference) from either B or A. Since this is not the case, it plainly follows that we 
ought to admit that the third term may possibly be identical (at least in its reference) to either B or 
A) – we cannot indeed reject the thesis that every proposition has a prosleptic counterpart, 
because Alexander explicitly holds this assumption. Moreover, it is possible to argue that this 
thesis is true even though A is not an infima species, because Aristotle holds that, given a random 
predicate P (either a property of a substance or a secondary substance), there is always a finite 
predicative chain, which links P to the ultimate subject of P, namely to an individual item, which 
falls under a certain indivisible species (cf. A. Post. A, 19-22). 
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proposition—must be in some cases the same term as A—the logical subject of the starting 
proposition. This claim, in other words, may be logically inferred from what Alexander 
explicitly held; but was he aware of such a thesis? Is there textual evidence in favour of this 
interpretation of the prosleptic translation of a given universal proposition—an interpretation 
which clearly makes room for a heterodox version of the dictum de omni et de nullo? 
 I claim that there is evidence in favour of this conclusion, namely that, in a proposition like  
(vi) if A is said of all C, then B is said of all C; 
C may designate the same thing designated by A, and C may even be the same term as A. 
In order to argue for this claim, it is necessary to make some preliminary remarks on 
Alexander’s theory of predication. 
First, in his comments on (Aristotle’s elucidations on) the dictum de omni et de nullo, 
Alexander says that, if B is said of all A, it is possible either that B is predicated also of items 
different from A, or that it is equal in extension to A (cf. in A. Pr. 25.7-9: ‘it is possible that 
what is said ‘of all’ of a given subject, is said of more elements than the subject is said, as in 
the case of ‘animal’, which is said of all ‘men’, or it is also possible that is said of an equal 
portion of things, as in the case of ‘able to laugh’, which is said of all ‘men’ ’). 28 Since in the 
prosleptic translation too we find two ‘κατὰ παντός’ predicative relations, it is possible to say 
also that either A is the genus of C, or A is equal in extension to C. 
Of course, if A is the genus of C, the two terms cannot refer to the same thing. In the case of a 
‘ἐπ᾿ ἴσης’ predicative relation, instead, it is possible that both terms refer to the same thing. 
The example that Alexander presents in these lines does not show this case, because he 
chooses the case of a substance (‘man’) and a substance’s proprium (‘able to laugh’). 29 
However, if one looks at the passages in which Alexander defines the ‘ἐπ᾿ ἴσης’ predication, it 
is arguable that he also makes room for a predication which joins two identical terms. 
Alexander claims that, if A and B are terms, A is said ‘ἐπ᾿ ἴσης’ of B, iff 
(1) B is said ‘ἐπ᾿ ἴσης’ of A; 
(2) if A is a (secondary) substance, B is either a proprium of A or a definition of A (and if 
B is a substance, then A is either a proprium or a definition of B); 
(3) neither A nor B are genus or accidents (unless A is the same term as B); 
(4) either A or B could be a differentia; 
(5) if A is a (specific) differentia, then B is the species singled out by A; and if B is a 
(specific) differentia, then A is the species singled out by B; 
                                                        
28
 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον εἶναι τὸ κατὰ παντός τινος λεγόµενον, ὡς τὸ ζῷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, 
ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἴσης, ὡς τὸ γελαστικὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 
29
 When Galen reconstructs the Peripatetics’ theory of prosleptic syllogism, he proposes a similar 
example, in which the terms of the prosleptic proposition have,  in one case, the same extension, 
but they are one the proprium of the other. Cf. Gal., Inst. Log. XIX, 4, 1-4: ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος 
συλλογισµῶν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ πρόσληψιν ‘ὃ κατὰ τοῦδε, καὶ κατὰ τοῦδε·οῦτόδε δὲ κατὰ 
τοῦδε·οὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦδε]’· ἐπ᾿ ὀνοµάτων δέ ‘ὃ κατὰ δένδρου, καὶ [κατὰ] πλατάνου·άφυτὸν δὲ 
κατὰ τοῦ δένδρου·ένδὶ κατὰ πλατάνου ἄρα’. 
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(6) neither A nor B can be primary substances or individual properties; 
(7) on the ground of (1), A may be replaced by B, and B replaced by A, without any 
alteration in the general meaning of the proposition in which they figure. 
These properties of the ‘ἐπ᾿ ἴσης’ predication need some textual justification if we want to 
safely ascribe them to the commentator of Aphrodisias, in order to infer the conclusion that A 
and B may even be the same term. Thesis (1) is clearly stated when Alexander distinguishes 
what is reciprocally predicated (ἀντικατηγορούµενον) from what is not reciprocally 
predicated and says that what is said to be ‘ἐπ᾿ ἴσης’ is reciprocally predicated too: 
 every predicate of some subject is necessarily said either of an extension 
equal to the one of the subject (and hence predicate and subject are said 
reciprocally one of the other) or is said not with the same extension of the 
subject. 30  
Theses (2) and (3) are expanded in the same context: according to Alexander, every predicate 
is either a genus or a proprium, or a definition, or an accident; 31 if the subject of predication is 
a substance, the predicate may have the same extension of the subject iff it is either a 
proprium or a definition.32 It is clear that the substance-subject must be a secondary 
substance, because a primary substance cannot have the same extension as a proprium which 
is shared by all the individuals falling under the same definition, and, a fortiori, such a 
substance cannot have the same extension of its definition, which is correctly predicated of all 
the other primary substances belonging to the same kind. Consequently, terms for individual 
substances or properties may not figure in a standard proposition (thesis 6), since the 
praedicabilia are kind terms. It is a more complex matter to establish whether the differentia 
could figure as term in an ἐπ᾿ ἴσης predication, because the status of the differentia remains 
rather obscure in Aristotle’s thought. 33 However, Alexander maintains that the differentia is 
said of the substance, and, hence, that it can figure in such a predicative relation iff the other 
term of which the differentia is said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης is the species singled out by the differentia.34 In 
conclusion, if A is said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης of B and B is said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης of A, then A and B are kind terms. 
At this stage, Alexander implicitly adds that A and B may be reciprocally replaced if A is said 
ἐπ᾿ ἴσης of B and B is said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης of A:  
Indeed, it is the same to say ‘a man is a man’ or ‘a man is a terrestrial two-footed 
animal’, because in both sentences the same thing is predicated of the same thing, 
and both things have the same extension, and hence [Aristotle] took the noun 
                                                        
30
 In Top. 63.27-28: πᾶν τὸ κατηγορούµενόν τινος ἀνάγκη ἢ ἐπ᾿ ἴσης αὐτῷ λέγεσθαι (καὶ 
ἀντικατηγορεῖται ταῦτα ἀλλήλων) ἢ µὴ ἐπ᾿ ἴσης. Cf. also in Top. 46.30-47.2 for the inverse 
relation: if ‘A is said of B, iff B is said of A’ (i.e., A and B are reciprocally predicated), then A 
and B are said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης. 
31
 Cf. in Top. 64.6-7: πᾶν ἄρα τὸ κατηγορούµενον ἢ ὡς ὅρος ἢ ὡς ἴδιον ἢ ὡς γένος ἢ ὡς 
συµβεβηκὸς κατηγορεῖται. 
32
 Cf. in Top. 63.28-31: τὸ µὲν ἀντικατηγορούµενον ἢ ὅρος ἢ ἲδιον, τὸ δὲ µὴ ἀντικατηγορούµενον 
ἢ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ὁρισµῷ τοῦ πράγµατός ἐστιν ἢ οὔ. καὶ εἰ µὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισµῷ, γένος ἢ 
διαφορὰ ἂν εἴη, εἰ δὲ µὴ ἐν τῷ ὁρισµῷ, συµβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη. 
33
 A persuasive description of Aristotle’s opinions on differentia may be found in Granger 1984; 
M. Mariani underlines the difficulties of Aristotle’s treatment of differentia in Mariani 1997.  
34
 Cf. in Top. 317.7-19. 
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instead of its definition.35   
Put differently, Alexander admits that, if two terms are predicated ἐπ᾿ ἴσης, one may replace 
the other in all its occurrences. The commentator does not derive this conclusion from the so-
called Leibniz’s law, according to which, iff A may replace B in every occurrence of B salva 
veritate, then A is identical with B. Alexander holds, instead, that, if A and B have the same 
extension—i.e., they may be predicated of the same set of terms or of individuals—then A 
may replace B, and B may replace A. 
I want to stress that the commentator explicitly states all these considerations. But what does 
this theory yield? It seems clear that, when translating the proposition (i) ‘B is said of all A’ 
into its prosleptic counterpart, the Cs of all of which A is said are designated by a term which 
is either A or a term which can replace A, according to the above-mentioned rule. 
This is consistent with Alexander’s claim that every proposition may be translated into a 
prosleptic counterpart. The puzzling case, as we have seen, is that in which a genus is 
predicated of an infima species: 
(i*) G is said of all S. 
The corresponding prosleptic is the following: 
(i**) G is said of all the C, of all of which S is said. 
The claimant for an orthodox version of the dictum de omni will say that the Cs are 
individuals which fall under S. However, this prevents any other prosleptic translation of a 
universal proposition such as  
(ii) G is said of all C, 
because a primary substance (as C is supposed to be, in our example) is not said of anything 
else by its definition.36 The supporter of the heterodox version, instead, may understand C in 
two ways: 
C is a term with the same extension as the infima species S; 
C is S. 
Since the prosleptic translation must always be possible, we cannot think that the Cs are 
exclusively terms with the same extension as S, but different from S—otherwise we are 
compelled to state that there are infinite propria for things, and this posit contradicts 
Aristotle’s (and Alexander’s) denial of the existence of infinite beings in the universe. But 
since hypothesis (b) is explicitly maintained by the commentator of Aphrodisias, there is no 
reason for claiming either that he was not a supporter of the heterodox dictum, nor that he is 
                                                        
35
 In Top. 67.9-11: ἴσον γάρ ἐστι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν ἢ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν· ἐν 
ἀµφοτέροις γὰρ αὐτὸ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγεται, καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἴσης ἀµφότερα·διὸ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁρισµοῦ τὸ ὄνοµα 
ἒλαβεν. 
36
 Cf. Arist., Cat. 5, 2 a11-13. 
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not consistent in holding this view. 
To summarize, it is not only possible to show that the arguments in favour of the attribution of 
the orthodox version of the dictum de omni to Alexander are not cogent; there are, indeed, 
many pieces of evidence supportive of the opposite claim. 
 
3. Why the Heterodox Interpretation Plays a Crucial Role in Alexander’s Syllogistic 
 
Even though what has been stated above has in itself some importance for a better 
understanding of Alexander’s logical thought, it may be worthwhile to outline the role this 
interpretation of the dictum plays within the general context of his syllogistic. As is well 
known, the interpretation of Aristotle’s categorical syllogistic does not pose particular logical 
difficulties, even though many explanations have been proposed of the Stagirite’s ideas, 
whereas modal syllogistic appears to be more controversial. A quick look at the 
interpretations of syllogistic may elucidate what the advantages of the heterodox version of 
the dictum de omni are, and to what extent Alexander was aware of these advantages. 
The heterodox version of the dictum de omni is useful in order to make sense of Aristotle’s 
much-disputed modal syllogistic. There are interpretations of modal syllogistic that are 
grounded on contemporary first order modal logic which, to some extent, make abstraction 
from Aristotle’s theory of predication as a semantic frame in which it is possible to understand 
his syllogistic.37 Other scholars, instead, think that Aristotle’s modal claims rest on his 
semantic assumption.38 Malink, in particular, has developed a mereological semantics that 
enables him to consider valid all and only the modal syllogistic connections accepted by 
Aristotle; this mereological semantics seems to require—or, at least, is theoretically related 
to—a heterodox reading of the dictum de omni et de nullo. 
What should we then say about Alexander? 
Prima facie, the commentator seems not to give a particular attention to the dictum while he 
comments on its definition (cf. in A. Pr. 24.21-25.23): he remarks that what is said ‘of every’ 
may be accounted as the counterpart of what is said to be in a whole.39 The difference is that 
what is said ‘of every’ is a predicate in a sentence, whilst what is said to be in a whole is a 
grammatical subject. Alexander does not present these principles as the basis upon which the 
whole syllogistic is built, and he speaks of what is said ‘of every’ in a way that seems to 
suggest an orthodox interpretation. When he gives an example of what is said ‘of every’, 
                                                        
37
 Apart from J. Łukasiewicz (cf.  Łukasiewicz 1958) and A. Becker (cf. Becker 1933), who both 
claimed that Aristotle’s modal logic was inconsistent, this way of interpreting Aristotle’s modal 
logic has been shared also by S. McCall (cf. McCall 1963), by K. Schmidt  (cf. Schmidt 1989), by 
U. Nortmann and T. Ebert (cf. their commentary on the first book of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics: 
Ebert-Nortmann 2007; see also Nortmann 1996), and more recently by A. Rini (cf. Rini 2011). 
38
 They include Johnson 1989, which provides a semantics for McCall’s syntactical 
reconstruction of modal syllogistics, Patterson 1995, Thom 1996, and Malink 2006.  
39
 On this passage see Gili 2011, pp. 175-176. 
 14 
 
Alexander says:  
animal is said of every man, inasmuch as it is not possible to pick out any 
man, of whom animal is not said.40   
This example seems to contrast with my interpretation, but the difficulty may be solved both 
(a) by saying that Alexander is not particularly careful in his expression (he imprecisely 
adopts the masculine accusative οὐδένα […] ἄνθροπον), and (b) by claiming that though 
readers may be tempted to read ‘any man’ as referring to Peter, Mary, Paul etc., Alexander is 
actually referring to any ‘part’ of man. This may become clearer if we recall that ‘to be said of 
every’ has the same meaning as ‘to be in a whole’, and that the standard example Alexander 
proposes for what is said to be in a whole involves a species that is said to be in a whole of a 
genus (cf. in A. Pr. 25.4-9): it is plain that this species-genus relation cannot be posited 
between an individual and the universal under which it falls if we want to define univocally 
this relation.41 Furthermore, it is worth noting that what is said to be in a whole may either be 
contained by something which has also other parts, or may be said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης—Alexander must 
have in mind the puzzle raised by his claim that every proposition has a prosleptic counterpart: 
a puzzle which may only be solved, as we have seen, by positing that there is something 
which is said ‘of every’ of something, though its predication is ἐπ᾿ ἴσης of the logical subject 
of the proposition. Even if Alexander is rather brief in his commentary on A. Pr. A, 1, 24 b26-
30, it is not an overstatement to say that with the principle of ‘being said in a whole’, the 
commentator thinks that Aristotle has laid the foundations for the entire syllogistic; and, as I 
have shown in presenting modern readings of syllogistic, this idea is connected with a 
heterodox reading of the dictum de omni et de nullo. Alexander maintains that the validity of 
categorical perfect syllogisms (i.e., of the first figure syllogisms Barbara, Celarent, Darii, 
Ferio) rests on the principle of ‘being said in a whole’, and so do the rules of conversions.42 
Clearly, the whole syllogistic is built upon the basis of these principles (perfect syllogisms, 
rules of conversion, and the reasoning per reductionem ad impossibile). As far as the 
conversion of universal negative propositions is concerned, Alexander rightly stresses that its 
validity is immethodically proved by employing the rule of conversion for particular 
affirmative propositions (cf. in A. Pr. 31.27-32.8), and thus it is necessary to make reference 
                                                        
40
 in A. Pr. 24.33-25.2: τὸ ζῷον κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου· οὐδένα γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἄνθροπον, 
καθ᾿ οὗ τὸ ζῷον οὐ ῥηθήσεται. 
41
 Tweedale 1984 convincingly shows that a universal is thought to be an accident for each of the 
individuals falling under it, and that its reality as a universal is mind-dependent; since an accident 
is a part of the whole, that is the concrete particular, rather than a whole, it is hard seeing the 
same part-whole relation, which exists between universals of lower and upper level, between a 
universal and its individuals too; hence, though admittedly Alexander never explicitly states that 
this relation is peculiar to universals in his extant writings, it is plausible to think that he holds 
this view. 
42
 Cf. in A. Pr. 54.6-12: ὑποµιµνήσκει δὲ ἡµᾶς, πῶς καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντός ἀπέδωκεν (“ὅταν γὰρ 
µηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν τοῦ ὑποκειµένου, καθ᾿οὗ τὸ κατεγορούµενον οὐ ῥηθήσεται”), ὑπὲρ τοῦ 
ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἔξοθεν ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συναγωγής χρεία πρὸς τὸ φανερὸν γενέσθαι τὸ 
ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ᾿ ἱκανὰ τὰ κείµενα· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς, ὅ ἐστι κείµενον καὶ εἰληµµένον διὰ τῶν 
προτάσεων, ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὴν δεῖξιν τῆς συναγωγῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τέλειοι οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες 
συλλογισµοὶ καὶ κυρίως ἀναπόδεικτοι (Barbara). For Celarent see in A. Pr. 55.3-7; for Darii cf. 
in A. Pr. 60.22-25; for Ferio cf. in A. Pr. 60.27-61.1. 
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to an external principle, namely to ‘being said of every’ or to its cognate principle of ‘being in 
a whole’. The proof for the conversion of universal negative propositions (CUN) runs as 
follows.43 The rule states that: 
(ThesisCUN) (1*) ‘A is said of no B’ yields (1**) ‘B is said of no A’. 
The procedure to prove (ThesisCUN) is an argument per reductionem ad impossibile, which 
takes for granted the opposition among propositions, described by Aristotle’s square. If 
(ThesisCUN) is not the case, then it is true that 
(2*=1*) ‘A is said of no B’ yields (2**) ‘B is said of some A’. 
Let us assume that the ‘part’ of A, of which B is said, is C; thus, from our assumption and 
from (2**), it follows that 
(3) B is said of every C. 
By the principle of being in a whole, from (3) follows that C is either a proper part of B, or 
that B is said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης of C, and thus that C is said ἐπ᾿ ἴσης of B. In virtue of our assumption, 
according to which C is a part of A, A is said of every C too. But since C is a part of B, then  
(4) A is said of some B. 
Since (4) is the contradictory of proposition (2*), it follows that propositions (2*) and (2**) 
are incompatible. If someone takes as true proposition (2*), he or she must also accept the 
contradictory of (2**), i.e., proposition (1**). Hence, (ThesisCUN) is proved to be sound, and 
by means of the rule of conversion of universal negative propositions all the other rules of 
conversion are proved to be true. It is noteworthy that Alexander omits any reference to a 
hypothetical dictum de aliquo, though this would easily explain the possibility of inferring (4) 
from (2**). Of course, if it is hard to decipher what a philosopher explicitly says, it is even 
harder to explain his or her omissions and silences. However, I find it plausible to hold that, 
with his omissions, Alexander was reacting against the view that the syllogisms of all figures 
are complete—an idea which had probably become influential among Aristotelians due to 
Boethos of Sidon’s endorsement thereof. As Malink has clearly shown, if someone assumes 
the four heterodox dicta, corresponding to the four types of propositions of Aristotle’s square, 
it is possible to prove the validity of every syllogism in virtue of one of the dicta. Since 
according to Alexander, a syllogism is complete only insofar as its validity is not proved by 
means of something external to it—and the dicta are thought to be internal to each 
                                                        
43
 Cf. in A. Pr. 32.8-21: [Ἀριστοτέλης] δείκνυσι µὲν γὰρ τὸ προκείµενον (scilicet: the rule of 
conversion for universal negative propositions) […] διὰ τῶν ἐφθακότων δεδεῖχθαί τε καὶ κεῖσθαι· 
ἔδτι δὲ ταῦτα τό τε κατὰ παντὸς καὶ τὸ κατὰ µηδενὸς καὶ ἐν ὅλῳ καὶ ἐν µηδενί· τούτοις γὰρ 
προσχρώµενος δείκνυσι τὴν τῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀντιστροφήν. κειµένου γὰπ 
τοῦ Α µηδενὶ τῷ Β φησὶν ἕπεσθαι τούτῳ τὸ καὶ τὸ Β µηδενὶ τῷ Α· εὶ γὰρ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Α ὑπάρχει 
(τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ἀντικείµενον τῷ κειµένῳ, καὶ δεῖ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς εἶναι), ὑπαρχέτω τῷ 
Γ· ἔστω γὰρ τοῦτο τὶ τοῦ Α, ᾧ ὑπάρχει τὸ Β. ἔσται δὴ Γ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Β καὶ τὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ 
παντὸς τοῦ Γ· ταὐτὸν γὰρ τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς. ἀλλ᾿ ἦν τὸ Γ τὶ τοῦ Α· ἐν ὅλῳ ἄρα καὶ 
τῷ Α τὸ Γ ἐστίν·σεἰ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ, κατὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ ῥηθήσεται τὸ Α. ἦν δὲ τὸ Γ τὶ τοῦ Β· καὶ τὸ Α 
ἄρα κατὰ τινὸς τοῦ Β κατηγορηθήσεται· ἀλλ᾿ ἔκειτο κατὰ µηδενὸς τὸ Α τοῦ Β· ἦν δὲ κατὰ 
µηδενὸς τὸ µηδὲν εἶναι τοῦ Β, καθ᾿ οὗ τὸ Α κατηγορηθήσεται. 
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proposition—from the assumption of the four dicta it would follow, within Alexander’s 
theory, that every syllogism is complete; and this Boethos had already claimed. As a 
consequence, Alexander restricts his assumptions to heterodox dictum de omni and to the 
heterodox dictum de nullo in order to avoid endorsing the philosophical claim that every 
syllogism is complete—a thesis which, according to him, contrasts with Aristotle’s teaching. 
This will be clearer if we look at the beginning of Alexander’s commentary on the modal 
section of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. The passage deserves our attention: ‘a similar 
conjunction of premises in each figure, with the addition of the necessity operator, will make 
the necessity syllogisms too […]. The reason for that is that [the principles] ‘to be said of 
every’ and ‘to be said of none’ are accepted in the case of necessity in a way analogous to that 
of the categorical [version of these principles], and by means of them the syllogisms of the 
first figure are proved to be valid’ (in A. Pr. 120.9-15).44  Alexander states that (a) the 
(categorical) dictum de omni et de nullo is the principle that proves the validity of complete 
syllogisms, and that (b) an extension of the dictum with the insertion of the necessity operator 
will be the basis for the proof of the validity of necessity first figure syllogisms. This 
indirectly confirms that, according to Alexander, categorical syllogistic rests on the dictum de 
omni et de nullo and so does necessity syllogistic, because both Aristotle and Alexander claim 
that, corresponding to each of the rules of categorical conversion there is a rule of necessity-
conversion, which is obtained by turning the categorical proposition into a necessity-
proposition. It is easy to show that also in the case of Barbara LLL we are able to prove its 
validity only on the basis of a heterodox dictum [necessarie] de omni. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper was designed to stress the crucial importance of the dictum de omni et de nullo in 
Alexander’s syllogistic, and to claim that the commentator consistently holds its heterodox 
interpretation—though sometimes he certainly expresses himself in an obscure way on this 
very topic. I find no evidence he was aware of the other (orthodox) possibility of interpreting 
Aristotle. However, he must have followed the Aristotelian tradition—which presumably 
counted Boethos among its most influential exponents—in arguing for the heterodox version. 
In this way Alexander discovered a key for establishing the whole syllogistic as a system, 
analogous to the systems of sciences such as physics, metaphysics and mathematics. As recent 
scholarship has persuasively argued, Alexander takes as a paradigm for all sciences what 
Aristotle states in the Posterior Analytics: a discipline is a science if it has proper axioms, an 
object of studies and properties of this object which are demonstrated by logical inference 
from axioms.45  The exposition of syllogistic is thus analogous to that of sciences (we have no 
textual evidence for claiming that Alexander considers syllogistic as a science), and the dicta 
                                                        
44
 ἡ γὰρ ὁµοία τῶν προτάσεων συµπλοκὴ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον σχῆµα µετὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀναγκαίου 
προσθήκης καὶ τοῦς ἀναγκαίους ποιήσει συλλογισµούς […]. αἴτιον δὲ τούτου, ὅτι τό τε κατὰ 
παντὸς καὶ τὸ κατὰ µηδενὸς ὁµοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου λαµβάνεται, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
ὑπάρχοντος, δι᾿ οὗ οἱ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήµατι δείκνυνται συλλογισµοί. 
45
 Cf. Bonelli 2001; Gili 2011; Gili 2012. 
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are somehow the axioms of the disciplines from which all the properties of the figures are 
derived, namely all valid syllogisms.46 This attempt at turning the discipline expounded by 
Aristotle in his Prior Analytics into a unified whole is thoroughly consistent with Alexander’s 
exegetical strategy.47  Following this strategy, Alexander used to interpret a passage by means 
of what has previously been said according to the order of reading of the Stagirite’s works. As 
a consequence, since the dictum de omni et de nullo is expounded by Aristotle in the very first 
lines of the Prior Analytics, the principle may well be taken to be one of the axioms of 
syllogistic in Alexander’s “scientific” interpretation of the discipline. To summarize, it is 
arguable that Alexander was brought to seek for principles of the whole syllogistic by his 
systematic exegetical praxis—and these principles were the heterodox categorical and the 
heterodox modal dictum de omni et de nullo. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am extremely thankful to the two anonymous referees of the journal for their invaluable 
comments on a previous version of this paper. I warmly thank the editor V. Peckhaus, for 
allowing me to have an exchange with one of the referees, and for his patience while 
waiting for the final version of the paper. I presented some of the ideas contained in this 
paper at the Lisbon workshop on modal syllogistic organized by R. Santos. I thank the 
audience, and especially P. Crivelli, M. Malink, and R. Santos for their comments. I 
thank O. Matulionyte, who discussed with me the final version of the article. All 
translations are mine. Remaining shortcomings and mistakes are only mine. 
 
Abbreviations 
A. Pr. = Aristotle, Prior Analytics (edition: Ross 1949). 
A. Post. = Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (edition: Ross 1949). 
Cat. = Aristotle, Categories (edition: Minio-Paluello, 1949). 
De Int. = Aristotle, De Interpretatione (edition: Minio-Paluello, 1949). 
In A. Pr. = Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, book I 
(edition: Wallies 1883). 
In Top. = Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics (edition: Wallies 
1891). 
Inst. Log. = Galen, Introduction to Logic (edition: Kalbfleisch 1896). 
Met. = Aristotle, Metaphysics (edition: Jaeger 1957) 
Top. = Aristotle, Topics (edition: Brunschwig 1967 and Brunschwig 2007). 
 
 
References 
Barnes, J. 2007.  Truth, etc., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Becker, A. 1933. Die aristotelische Theorie der Möglichkeitsschlüsse. Eine logisch-
philologische Untersuchung der Kapitel 13-22 von Aristoteles’ Analytica Priora, Berlin: 
Juncker und Dünnhaupt. 
Bonelli, M. 2001. Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisica come scienza dimostrativa, 
Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2001. 
                                                        
46
 Cf. Gili 2011, pp. 62-86; 177-178. 
47
 On Alexander’s exegesis see Donini 1994.  
 18 
 
Brunschwig, J. 1967. Aristote. Topiques. I-IV, Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
Brunschwig, J. 2007. Aristote. Topiques. V-VIII, Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
Crivelli, P. 2011. ‘Semantiche per la sillogistica di Aristotele’, in M. S. Funghi, Papiri 
filosofici. Miscellanea di studi VI, Firenze: Olschki, 297-317. 
Crivelli, P. 2012. ‘ Aristotle’s Logic’, in C. Shields, The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113-149. 
Donini, P. 1994. ‘Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i 
metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica’, in W. Haase, Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
Römischen Welt, Teil II, Band 36.7, Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 3484-3504. 
Ebert, T. - Nortmann U. 2007. Aristoteles. Analytica Priora. Buch I, übersetzt und 
erläutert von T. Ebert und U. Nortmann, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
Gili, L. 2011. La sillogistica di Alessandro di Afrodisia. Sillogistica categorica e 
sillogistica modale nel commento agli Analitici Primi di Aristotele, Hildesheim-Zürich-
New York: Olms. 
Gili, L. 2012. ‘ Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Solution to the Puzzle of the Two Modal 
Barbaras: a Semantic Approach’, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica 
Medievale 23, 35-64. 
Granger, H. 1984. ‘Aristotle on Genus and Differentia’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 22(1), 1-23. 
Jaeger, W. 1957. Aristotelis Metaphysica, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica 
instruxit W. Jaeger, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Johnson, F. 1989. ‘Models for Modal Syllogisms’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 
30, 271-284. 
Kalbfleisch, C. 1896. Galeni Institutio Logica, edidit C. Kalbfleisch, Leipzig: Teubner. 
Łukasiewicz, J. 1958. Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal 
Logic, Oxford: Clarendon Press (second enlarged edition). 
Malink, M. 2006. ‘A Reconstruction of Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic’, History and 
Philosophy of Logic 27, 95-141. 
Malink, M. 2008. ‘ΤΩΙ vs ΤΩΝ in Prior Analytics 1.1–22’, Classical Quarterly 58, 519-
536. 
Malink, M. 2009. ‘A Non-Extensional Notion of Conversion in the Organon’, Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 37, 105-141. 
Mariani, M. 1997. ‘Aristotele e la differenza’, in A. Fabris, G. Fioravanti, and E. 
Moriconi, Logica e teologia: studi in onore di Vittorio Sainati, Pisa: Ets, 1-27. 
McCall, S. 1963. Aristotle’s Modal Syllogisms, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Minio-Paluello, L. 1949. Aristotelis Categoriae et De Interpretatione, recognovit 
brevique adnotatione critica instruxit L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Morison, B. 2008. ‘Aristotle, etc.’, Phronesis 53, 209-222. 
Nortmann, U. 1996. Modale Syllogismen, mögliche Welten, Essentialismus. Eine 
Ananlyse der aristotelischen Modallogik,  Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Patterson, R. 1995. Aristotle’s Modal Logic. Essence and Entailment in the Organon, 
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. 
Rini, A. 2011. Aristotle’s Modal Proofs: Prior Analytics A8-22 in Predicate Logic, 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Ross, W.D. 1949. Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, a Revised Text with 
Introduction and Commentary by W.D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 19 
 
Schmidt, K. 1989. ‘Eine modal-prädikatenlogische Interpretation der modalen Syllogistik 
des Aristoteles’, Phronesis 34, 80-106. 
Thom, P. 1996. The Logic of Essentialism. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Modal 
Syllogistic, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Tweedale, M.M. 1984. ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Views on Universals’, Phronesis 29, 
279-303. 
Wallies, M. 1883. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum librum I 
commentarium, edidit M. Wallies, Berlin: Reimer. 
Wallies, M. 1891. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo 
commentaria, edidit M. Wallies, Berlin: Reimer. 
